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Exemptions and Alleviations from the Duty to Publish 
a Prospectus under FinSA and FinSO – A Practical 
Perspective
Reference: CapLaw-2020-70
On 1 December 2020, the revised duty to publish an approved prospectus in accordance 
with the Financial Services Act and the Financial Services Ordinance became fully 
effective. A remarkable novelty of the new Swiss prospectus regime is the introduced 
set of explicit exemptions and alleviations from the duty to publish a prospectus, which 
are largely in line with the Prospectus Regulation (earlier, the Prospectus Directive) of 
the European Union. This article discusses the exemptions and alleviations from the 




In a series of earlier articles in this newsletter (CapLaw 2016-1, CapLaw 2017-1, 
CapLaw 2018-56, CapLaw 2019-51), Christian Rehm and René Bösch introduced 
the new Swiss prospectus regime. In this article, I will take a closer look at exemptions 
and alleviations from the duty to publish a prospectus. My main point is that 
exemptions from the duty to publish a prospectus have passed the acid test, but also 
that alleviations from the duty to publish a prospectus have missed the target, at least 
in part.
On 1 January 2020, the Financial Services Act (FinSA) and the Financial Services 
Ordinance (FinSO) entered into effect. Since FINMA licensed the reviewing body 
for prospectuses with effect from 1 June 2020, triggering the statutory transition 
period of six months, the duty to publish an approved prospectus, together with the 
respective rules and regulations, became fully effective on 1 December 2020.
It is fair to say that the new prospectus regime represents a veritable paradigm 
change to Swiss financial market law. In comparison with previously applicable rules 
and regulations in Switzerland, a remarkable novelty of the new financial market 
architecture is the explicit stipulation of exemptions and alleviations from the duty 
to publish a prospectus in accordance with article 35 FinSA. These exemptions 
and alleviations were largely inspired by international standards, embodied in 
the Prospectus Directive (applicable at the time) and the Prospectus Regulation 
(applicable today) of the European Union.
In this article, I discuss these exemptions and alleviations from a practical 
perspective. From the variety of open issues, the article seeks to provide a broad 
conceptual analysis of those legal institutions, but also to clarify selected questions of 


















2) Exemptions from Duty to Publish a Prospectus
a) System of Prospectus Exemptions
i. Exemptions for Public Offer by Type of Offering
According to legislative materials, exemptions by type of offering are to be understood 
conclusively. Consequently, a total of six exemptions can be distinguished. If the 
requirements of a private placement exemption are given, a public offer can be made 
without publishing a prospectus. Pursuant to relevant legislative materials, all these 
exemptions are justified from the perspective of investor protection and for reasons of 
proportionality.
– Article 36(1)(a) FinSA applies to public offers that are exclusively addressed at in-
vestors classified as professional clients within the meaning of article 4(3) FinSA. 
From a practical perspective, this exemption is of particularly high relevance.
– Article 36(1)(b) FinSA relates to public offers that are addressed at fewer than 500 
investors. Other than in Europe, it is arguably not possible to combine the 500 ex-
emption with the exemption for professional clients. First, Swiss law does not pro-
vide for this option. Second, the threshold of 500 is much higher than 150. Apart 
from that, the 500 exemption is apparently not very practical, if the offering is han-
dled by a consortium of investment banks, as such banks hardly ever let each other 
look into their books.
– Article 36(1)(c) FinSA refers to public offers that are addressed at investors acquir-
ing securities to the value of at least CHF 100,000. Assuming that wealthy inves-
tors are more sophisticated and thus need no protection, this exemption is some-
what similar to, but still different from, the professional clients exemption mentioned 
above.
– Article 36(1)(d) FinSA is available for public offers with a minimum denomination 
per unit of CHF 100,000. This exemption is particularly important for bonds and 
other debt instruments.
– Article 36(1)(e) FinSA covers public offers not exceeding a total value of CHF 8 
million over a 12-month period. Due to these thresholds, it can be expected that 
mainly small and medium-sized enterprises or start-up companies will claim this ex-
emption.
– An additional exemption, which is applicable to financial service providers only, is 
enacted in article 36(4) FinSA. It is restricted to securities offered publicly at a later 
stage and requires (a) existence of a valid prospectus, and (b) consent for use of 
the issuer or persons, who have assumed responsibility for the prospectus, within 


















Article 36(5) FinSA contains a delegation clause, which is unique in Swiss legislation to 
date. According to this clause, the Federal Council may adjust the number of investors 
and the amounts under letters (b) to (e) of article 36(1) FinSA, thereby taking account 
of recognized international standards and legal developments abroad. These rather 
tight restrictions reasonably limit delegation power.
ii. Exemptions for Public Offer by Type of Security
According to legislative materials, exemptions by type of security can be justified by 
the fact that investor protection in the form of a prospectus is not necessary in all 
these cases, since investors are sufficiently protected or at least informed about these 
securities in another, comparable way. This list of exemptions is relatively long and at 
first glance perhaps somewhat opaque.
– First of all, article 37(1) FinSA applies to equity securities (a) issued outside the 
scope of a capital increase in exchange for previously issued equity securities of the 
same class, (b) issued or delivered on the conversion or exchange of financial in-
struments of the same issuer or corporate group, or (c) issued or delivered follow-
ing exercise of a right linked to financial instruments of the same issuer or corpo-
rate group. With a view to practical relevance, convertible or exchangeable bonds 
and similar instruments are among the most likely candidates claiming this exemp-
tion.
– Article 37(1) FinSA also applies to securities (d) offered for exchange in connec-
tion with a takeover, or (e) offered or allocated in connection with a merger, divi-
sion, conversion, or transfer of assets, provided that information equivalent in terms 
of content to a prospectus is available. With regard to the equivalence requirement, 
which is defined in article 46(1) FinSO, it is interesting to note that pursuant to arti-
cle 46(3) FinSO, information in a prospectus for public exchange offers is deemed 
to be equivalent under these rules and regulations, but this assumption does not ex-
ist for the documentation relating to mergers and other corporate restructurings.
– Article 37(1)(f) FinSA is applicable to equity securities distributed as dividends to 
holders of equity securities of the same class, provided that there is information on 
the number and type of equity securities and on reasons for and details of the offer. 
For such dividends, in cases where there is no election by shareholders between 
dividend in kind and cash dividend, the exemption does not have to be relied on in 
the first place because there is no (public) offer at all.
– Without further requirements, article 37(1)(g) FinSA relates to securities offered 
or allocated to current or former members of the board of directors or manage-


















means of protection vis-à-vis employers that do not warrant another protection by 
way of disclosure.
– With a view to the type of issuer, article 37(1)(h) FinSA covers securities issued by, 
or with an unlimited and irrevocable guarantee from, the Confederation or cantons, 
an international or supranational public entity, the Swiss National Bank, or foreign 
central banks. It is unfortunate that municipal public entities (in particular large cit-
ies) were not included in the list; this should be amended, even though investors are 
often not so well informed about municipalities.
– Due to a lack of significant threat to investor protection, article 37(1)(i) FinSA refers 
to securities issued by non-profit institutions for raising funds for non-commercial 
purposes.
– Finally, article 37(1) FinSA is available for (j) medium-term notes, (k) money market 
instruments, and (l) derivatives not offered in the form of an issue. These exemp-
tions are convincingly formulated and make sense.
Article 37(2) FinSA contains a delegation clause, which is more comprehensive than 
the one discussed above. Pursuant to this clause, the Federal Council may provide for 
additional exemptions from the duty to publish a prospectus for further types of publicly 
issued securities, again taking account of recognized international standards and legal 
developments abroad. This clause is certainly not unproblematic, as it considerably 
weakens the rule of law. After all, it allows a rather fast change of the regime in FinSO 
as compared to a change of FinSA itself.
iii. Exemptions for Admission to Trading
Exemptions for admission to trading are mostly adapted to the corresponding European 
rules and regulations. However, they take into account certain specialties of the Swiss 
capital market. This includes in particular exemptions by type of security, since only 
those are controllable by a trading venue.
– Article 38(1)(a) FinSA covers equity securities that over a period of 12 months ac-
count for less than 20% of the number of equity securities of the same category al-
ready admitted to trading on the same trading venue. Compared to the previously 
applicable standard in the Listing Rules of SIX Swiss Exchange, this exemption rep-
resents a significant expansion in size. However, the exemption does no longer ap-
ply to increases of debt instruments.
– Article 38(1)(b) FinSA applies to equity securities issued upon conversion or ex-
change of financial instruments or following the exercise of rights linked to financial 


















category as those already admitted to trading. This is the case, if essential charac-
teristics of equity securities are basically identical.
– Article 38(1)(c) FinSA relates to securities admitted to trading on a foreign trading 
venue, provided that such venue's regulation, supervision, and transparency are ac-
knowledged as being appropriate by the domestic trading venue, or transparency 
for investors is ensured by other means. The concept of recognized foreign trading 
venue is specified in article 48 FinSO. Similarly, article 47 FinSO relates to securi-
ties admitted to trading on another Swiss trading venue.
– Article 38(1)(d) FinSA refers to securities for which admission is sought for a trad-
ing segment open exclusively to professional clients, provided that such investors 
are trading for their own account or for the account of other professional clients. 
This exemption is also legitimate – yet, no such segment exists today.
Article 38(2) FinSA further provides that exemptions from the duty to publish a 
prospectus by type of offering and by type of security apply by analogy to admission 
to trading. Article 49 FinSO specifies, where and to what extent this is the case. 
However, looking at the wording of article 49 FinSO, it should not be assumed that this 
provision is exhaustive because, i.e., the minimum denomination exemption could also 
be applicable in this respect.
b) Equal Treatment of Investors
Article 39 FinSA provides equal treatment with regard to information. Pursuant to this 
provision, which applies to information beyond the scope and in the absence of a duty 
to publish a prospectus, offerors or issuers shall treat investors alike, when sending 
them essential information on a public offer. As briefly discussed here, this provision 
gives rise to many conceptual issues and interpretative questions.
On a conceptual level, it is important to note that this provision does in fact not add 
anything new, as the equal treatment of investors follows already from the (unwritten) 
general principle of capital market law on equal treatment of market participants in 
general and investors in particular. Just like this general principle of law, article 39 
FinSA requires no absolute equality, but only relative equality (no selective disclosure). 
Under certain circumstances, a differentiated treatment of various investors can be 
justified. It is required, however, that such treatment is based on objective reasons and 
proportionate. An objective reason may be given, if such action lies in the best interest 
of all investors, or if investor protection is ensured by other means.
In addition, the scope of application of article 39 FinSA is unclear. With regard to the 
personal scope of application, reference is made to offerors and issuers, suggesting 
that there is a public offer or admission to trading. With respect to the material scope 


















In addition, both the heading (information beyond the scope of the duty to publish 
a prospectus) and the introductory sentence (in the absence of a duty to publish a 
prospectus) indicate that there is no need for an offer at all.
Consequently, article 39 FinSA not only applies to private placements, which 
benefit from an exemption from the duty to publish a prospectus, but also to other 
capital market transactions, in which no public offer was made and no admission to 
trading was sought in the first place. Therefore, this provision, which is designed to 
prevent unjustified selective disclosure, also includes the process of an accelerated 
bookbuilding and blocktrades in particular.
3) Alleviations from Duty to Publish a Prospectus
a) General-Abstract Approach to Abridgments
i. Alleviations by Type of Issuer
The general-abstract alleviations by type of issuer, which provide for certain 
abridgments, are largely in line with European rules and regulations, while at the same 
time taking into account particularities of the Swiss market.
– Article 47(1) FinSA applies to economically less important companies, in particular 
small and medium-sized enterprises. FinSO annexes 1 to 5 all include alleviations 
for such companies, but the abridgments are practically inexistent.
– Article 47(2)(a) FinSA relates to small caps, i.e., issuers with low market capitaliza-
tion on a trading venue. FinSO annexes 1 to 5, however, do not contain any allevia-
tions and abridgments for small caps.
– Article 47(2)(c) FinSA refers to well-known seasoned issuers, i.e., issuers that regu-
larly offer securities publicly, or whose securities are admitted to trading on a foreign 
trading venue, whose regulation, supervision, and transparency are acknowledged 
as being appropriate by a domestic trading venue. Article 57(2) FinSO defines well-
known seasoned issuers as issuers that (a) have been listed with equity securities 
on the Swiss benchmark index for at least 2 years, and (b) have debt instruments 
outstanding with a total par value of at least CHF 1 billion. FinSO annexes 1 to 5 all 
include alleviations and several abridgments for well-known seasoned issuers.
– Moreover, article 47(2) FinSA may also be applicable to other issuers, e.g., start-
up or growth companies. Other than the European rules and regulations, FinSO an-
nexes 1 to 5 do not contain any alleviations and abridgments specifically for such 
companies.
In addition, article 47(3)(e) FinSA provides that alleviations by type of issuer shall be 


















some extent, this rule enables the consideration of particularities of start-up or growth 
companies.
ii. Alleviations by Type of Offering
The general-abstract alleviations by type of offering, which also provide for certain 
abridgments, are perfectly congruent with the European rules and regulations and with 
the previously applicable Listing Rules of SIX Swiss Exchange.
– Article 47(2)(b) FinSA covers and FinSO annexes 1, 4, and 5 include alleviations by 
type of offering. According to those schemes, some abridgments are available for 
issues of subscription rights in particular, but not for rights issues in general.
– In my opinion, however, article 47(2)(b) FinSA also covers issues of advance sub-
scription rights. Therefore, similar abridgments should be included in FinSO an-
nex 2.
In addition, article 47(3)(b) FinSA provides that alleviations by type of offering shall 
be granted uniformly and with respect to issue volume. This makes perfect sense, as 
existing investors are less affected by smaller offers.
iii. Alleviations for Other Reasons
Providing for further abridgments, the general-abstract alleviations for other reasons 
include in particular alleviations by type of transaction, but also alleviations by type of 
security, for the market, and for investors.
– Article 47(2) FinSA implicitly allows and FinSO annexes 1 to 5 include alleviations 
by type of transaction. According to these regulations, a few abridgments are avail-
able for a public offer without admission to trading and for the admission to trading 
without public offer.
– Article 47(2) FinSA implicitly permits further alleviations, e.g., by type of security, for 
the market, and for investors. However, FinSO annexes 1 to 5 do not contain any al-
leviations and abridgments of this kind, at least not in the current version.
After all, article 47(3) FinSA provides that alleviations for other reasons shall be granted 
uniformly and in particular with respect to (a) type of securities issued, (c) market 
environment, and (d) investors' specific requirements for transparent information. In 
this respect, I am convinced that legal scholarship and capital market practice will point 
the way forward in the coming months and years.
b) Individual-Concrete Approach to Abridgments
Besides the general-abstract approach discussed above, another approach exists. 


















abridgments, i.e., by deciding whether and to what extent certain information need not 
be included in the prospectus on a case-by-case basis.
– Article 41(1)(a) FinSA applies to disclosure seriously detrimental to offerors or is-
suers. Besides disclosure being seriously detrimental, this alleviation requires that 
an omission would not mislead investors with regard to facts and circumstances es-
sential to an informed assessment of quality of issuer and characteristics of securi-
ties. In practical terms, this alleviation may apply to a situation, where offerors or is-
suers are in the process of planning future transactions.
– Article 41(1)(b) FinSA relates to information of minor importance. Under this alle-
viation, information is only of minor importance, if it has no bearing on the assess-
ment of business situation and main prospects, risks, and litigation of the issuer 
or guarantor and security provider. In practice, this alleviation may be relevant for 
changes of notes in financial statements.
– Article 41(1)(c) FinSA refers to securities traded on another trading venue. This al-
leviation covers securities traded on a trading venue, provided that issuer's periodic 
reporting over the last 3 years complied with applicable financial reporting require-
ments. In my understanding, this alleviation only applies to public offers, as corre-
sponding exemptions already exist with regard to admission to trading, notably in 
article 38(1)(c) FinSA and article 47 FinSO.
Pursuant to article 41(2) FinSA, the reviewing body may, to a limited degree, grant 
further alleviations, provided that interests of investors remain protected. Article 52(1) 
FinSO clarifies that it may depart from requirements in accordance with FinSO 
annexes 1 to 5. Article 52(2) FinSO specifies that it may grant further alleviations 
dependent on conditions such as incorporation of further or additional details. For 
example, where collateralized securities are issued, information of the issuer or 
guarantor is less important than information on the collateral.
4) Conclusion
From a practical perspective, capital market transactions by way of private placements 
have not always been crystal clear in the Swiss market. Following the role model of the 
European Union, Switzerland introduced a set of explicit exemptions as part of its new 
prospectus regime. Based on the analysis above, I tend to conclude that exemptions 
from the duty to publish a prospectus have passed the acid test. The codification of 
exemptions can be qualified as gain in legal certainty. However, what could and should 
be done better in the future relates to the clarification of the relationship between 
individual exemptions. To give an example, it still seems controversial in the legal 
literature, whether or not the exemption for professional clients can be combined with 
the 500 exemption. The same applies to exemptions from various other categories, 

























Since corporations not listed on a stock exchange are now confronted with 
considerable additional expenditures of time and costs, it was definitely appropriate to 
meet these challenges with simplified and proportionate prospectus requirements. In 
my analysis, however, I come to the conclusion that alleviations from the duty to publish 
a prospectus have missed the target, at least in part. The general-abstract approach 
underlying individual schemes on minimum content of the prospectus has clearly not 
succeeded. The individual-concrete approach is currently still under development, 
whereby an orientation to previous practice and other capital market transactions 
would be advisable. As a result, it can be stated that general-abstract checklists are 
often not helpful, as individual-concrete considerations in each case may be needed.
Valentin Jentsch (valentin.jentsch@rwi.uzh.ch)
Insurance Supervision Act: Proposed New Rules regarding 
Distribution of Insurance Products (Point of Sale) and 
Insurance Intermediaries
Reference: CapLaw-2020-71
On 21 October 2020, the Swiss Federal Council published a message to Parliament 
(Botschaft) (message-ISA) for a revision of the Insurance Supervision Act (ISA), 
including a draft of the new provisions (draft-ISA). Among others, the proposed 
legislation introduces new rules regarding the distribution of insurance products 
(point of sale), in particular insurance products with investment character (qualified 
life insurance products), and thereby to some extent aligns the distribution rules with 
those of the Swiss Financial Services Act (FSA). In addition, the proposed new rules 
provide for certain far-reaching changes for insurance intermediaries, which affect 
the scope of their services, their organization and cooperations.
By Bertrand Schott / Simon Bühler
1) Overview
The proposed new regulation concerning obligations at the point of sale leads to 
a certain alignment with the FSA, in particular with regard to the new category of 
qualified life insurance products. Insurance products are outside the scope of the 
FSA. The aim of the new regulation is to create a level playing field among investment 
instruments, which made it necessary to create a regulation similar to the FSA for 
insurance products that have an investment character. 
In our view, the new duties of the draft-ISA are of purely supervisory law nature, i.e. they 



















one should also note that the revision of the Swiss Insurance Contract Act (coming 
into force on 1 January 2022) further increases the protection of the insureds.
The regulation in the draft-ISA is designed to cover distribution activities, in particular 
the recommendation of products, rather than for example portfolio-related advice or 
portfolio management, which is why, for example, the draft-ISA does not provide for 
a duty to perform a suitability check as contained in the FSA. The new obligations at 
the point of sale apply in relation to all insureds; there is no client segmentation and 
corresponding gradation of point of sale obligations as provided for in the FSA. While 
the draft-ISA provides for a category of "professional insureds" as defined in the new 
Swiss Insurance Contract Act, these by their nature typically do not hold life insurance 
policies and, therefore, are usually outside the scope of most of the new distribution 
rules.
The following is an overview of the proposed point of sale obligations: 
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39j 39j CHECK times
Documentation 39k(1) 39k(1) CHECK times










Registration with  
Ombudsman's Office
82c(1)
82c(1) (non-tied  
intermediaries only)
CHECK CHECK
* all numbers refer to the draft-ISA
The draft-ISA also provides for certain other far-reaching changes for insurance 
intermediaries, which affect the scope of their services and their organization in 
relation to all insurance products. An important change concerns the new rule that 
insurance intermediaries may only be either tied or non-tied; both at the same time 
is no longer possible. This will require major business adjustments, including the review 



















requirement for non-tied insurance intermediaries, which has been extended and 
adapted to the FSA. Unlike under the FSA, one of the new draft-ISA requirements 
for entry in the register is that the non-tied insurance intermediary must have its 
seat, domicile or a branch in Switzerland (however, the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (FINMA) may grant exceptions in justified cases). Since the 
register for non-tied insurance intermediaries is kept directly by FINMA (unlike the 
adviser's register under the FSA), non-tied intermediaries are supervised persons in 
the sense of the Swiss Financial Market Supervision Act. In contrast, tied insurance 
intermediaries are not subject to a registration requirement because they are already 
supervised by FINMA via the insurance company for which they work (unchanged).
The revised ISA is expected to enter into force no earlier than January 2022 with 
transitional periods for certain key changes, such as a transitional period of one year 
for the distribution rules regarding qualified life insurance products (for more details, 
see article 90a draft-ISA).
2) Proposed New Distribution Rules for Insurance Companies  
and Intermediaries
a) Definition of Qualified Life Insurance Products
The proposed new rules at the point of sale mainly apply to so-called qualified 
insurance products (qualifizierte Lebensversicherungen; article 39a draft-ISA). As the 
message-ISA explains, this term is supposed to capture all insurance products with an 
investment character rather than pure risk insurance products.
Article 39a draft-ISA defines qualified life insurance products as (a) life insurance 
products that involve a risk of loss for the insured in the savings process, (b) capital 
redemption operations (Kapitalisationsgeschäfte) or (c) tontines (Tontinengeschäfte):
– Life insurance products that involve a risk of loss for the insured in the sav-
ings process concern products of all life insurance classes (except for classes A6 
and A7 described below) that involve a risk of loss due to market fluctuations. As 
per the message-ISA, a risk of loss means that the present value of the savings por-
tion of an insurance policy at the time of ordinary payment or conversion may be 
lower than the nominal amount of all savings premiums paid. Thus, life insurance 
products without investment components or with participation in surplus as the only 
investment component are not considered qualified life insurance products.
– Capital redemption operations (insurance class A6) are contracts under which 
the client transfers assets and delegates their management (based on a mathemat-
ical model) to an insurance company that involves no (or very limited) biometric risks 



















capital redemption operations, "as a rule", involve an investment risk for the insured, 
which is why it is justified to classify them as qualified life insurance products.
– Tontines (insurance class A7) are contracts under which the contributions of all 
insureds are pooled and invested, whereby the investment risk remains with the 
insureds. The resulting capital is distributed as an annuity (lebenslange Rente) to 
the insureds alive and, if provided so in the contract, to the heirs of the deceased 
insureds (see message-ISA). In the words of the message-ISA, the "predominant 
capital market element" of tontines justifies treating them as qualified life insurance 
products.
The first category (life insurance products involving a risk of loss) was still referred to in 
the preliminary draft as "life insurance products involving an investment risk", which is 
more far-reaching, because an investment risk can also consist of a product performing 
below average in comparison with other (comparable) products, for example. Under the 
proposed new rule (and according to the message-ISA), all life insurance products with 
capital protection (in the sense of protection of the investment brought in) are outside 
the scope of the definition.
b) Basic Information Sheet / Advertising
Insurance companies offering qualified life insurance products must prepare a 
Basic Information Sheet (BIS) (Basisinformationsblatt) for these with information 
that is easily understandable, kept up-to-date and enabling the insured to compare 
similar qualified life insurance products (article 39b-d draft-ISA; the FSA contains 
corresponding requirements). Article 39g draft-ISA introduces a liability for anyone 
who fails to exercise due care and thereby provides in the BIS information that is 
inaccurate, misleading or in violation of statutory requirements. When recommending 
a qualified life insurance product, the BIS must be provided (free of charge) by the 
insurance company or intermediary, respectively, prior to the conclusion of the contract 
(article 39h(1) draft-ISA).
Advertisements for qualified life insurance products must be clearly recognizable as 
such (article 39i(1) draft-ISA). The advertisement must contain a reference to the BIS 
and to where it can be obtained (article 39i(2) draft-ISA). Information conveyed (by 
advertising or other means) must be consistent with the information in the BIS (article 
39i(3) draft-ISA).
c) Duty to Provide Information
As is already the case under current law, insurance intermediaries will be subject to 
a duty to provide certain basic information to their clients in advance in relation to 
all insurance products (for details, see article 45 draft-ISA that extends the scope 



















standardized form. Specific information duties apply with regard to compensation from 
third parties (see 2) f)) and potential conflicts of interest (see 3) c)).
d) Appropriateness Check
Before providing recommendations on qualified life insurance products, the 
insurance company or intermediary, respectively, has to perform an appropriateness 
check (article 39j draft-ISA; the FSA contains a corresponding requirement). To this 
end, the insurance company or intermediary, respectively, must request information on 
the insured's knowledge and experience. If the insurance company or intermediary, 
respectively, concludes that a qualified life insurance product is not appropriate for the 
insured, it shall advise the insured against such product. If the information provided 
is not sufficient to assess appropriateness, the insured must be informed that no 
appropriateness check is conducted. 
No appropriateness check is required if a qualified insurance product is concluded on 
the initiative of the insured and without rendering personal advice (execution only).
e) Documentation and Rendering of Account
Insurance companies and intermediaries shall be subject to documentation and ac-
countability obligations for qualified life insurance products under the proposed new 
rules (article 39k draft-ISA). The documentation requirement includes (a) the keep-
ing of record of which qualified life insurance contract was concluded, (b) the informa-
tion collected on knowledge and experience of the insureds, (c) the absence of an ap-
propriateness test (if applicable) and (d) any issued recommendation against entering 
into qualified life insurance contracts.
On request, insurance companies and intermediaries shall be required to provide the 
insureds with (a) a copy of the documentation (or make it available in another appropri-
ate manner) and (b) information on the underlying financial instruments' valuation, per-
formance and costs. The insureds' entitlement and the procedure for obtaining a copy 
of the file and other information is governed by articles 80 et seq. draft-ISA.
f) Compensation from Third Parties 
Compensation from third parties regularly aim at promoting certain types of insurance 
products and thus lead to a potential conflict of interest for the party distributing the 
insurance products. The draft-ISA addresses this as follows:
Insurance companies are required to inform insureds about compensation from 
third parties received in connection with qualified life insurance products when 
recommending such products (article 39h(2) draft-ISA), but not about compensation 



















message-ISA yet define the type and scope of information required. In our view, the 
standard as set forth for non-tied insurance intermediaries (see below) may be applied.
Non-tied insurance intermediaries are by definition in a fiduciary relationship 
(Treueverhältnis) with the insureds and must act in their interest (as opposed to 
tied insurance intermediaries who typically act on behalf of an insurance company). 
The proposed new regulation contains the following rules that apply in relation to all 
insurance products intermediated (article 45b draft-ISA):
– In case remuneration of the non-tied insurance intermediary is limited to com-
missions received from insurance companies (or from any third party): If the 
non-tied insurance intermediary receives its entire compensation from the insur-
ance company or from any third party (commission), there is a duty to inform the 
insured in advance of such commission (see below).
– In case remuneration of the non-tied insurance intermediary includes both com-
missions received from insurance companies (or from any third party) and 
(direct) compensation from the insured: If the non-tied insurance intermediary 
receives both a commission from the insurance company (or from any third party) 
and a remuneration from the insured at the point of sale, a disclosure of the com-
missions is not sufficient. In addition, the insurance intermediary must obtain from 
the insured an express waiver regarding the handing over of the commission. If no 
such waiver is obtained, the commissions must be handed over to the insured.
In both cases (as described above), the information regarding compensation from 
third parties must meet certain minimum requirements (article 45b(3) draft-ISA). In 
terms of content, it must include the type and scope of the remuneration. Disclosure 
of calculation parameters and bandwidths is sufficient if the amount is not 
determinable in advance (i.e., prior to the conclusion of the contract between the non-
tied intermediary and its client). If, in such cases, calculation parameters and bandwidths 
are disclosed in advance, this is sufficient in our view, i.e. the non-tied intermediary 
does not need to provide further information on the individual (concrete) third-party 
compensation at a later date when the amount of such third-party compensation can 
be determined. Further, the information must be provided in advance, i.e. "before 
the service is provided or before the contract is concluded". In addition, the non-tied 
insurance intermediary must provide information on actual compensation received from 
third parties on request.
Compensation in the above sense is defined as payments from third parties accruing 
to the non-tied insurance intermediary in connection with the provision of a 
service, such as brokerage fees, commissions, discounts or other financial benefits 



















3) Proposed New Rules for Insurance Intermediaries
a) Obligation to Opt for either Tied or Non-Tied Intermediary
Against the background of protecting insureds from conflicts of interest, the proposed 
new regulation prohibits insurance intermediaries from operating as tied (on behalf 
of an insurance company) and non-tied (in the interest of the insured) insurance 
intermediary at the same time (article 44(1)(b) draft-ISA).
The clear distinction between tied and non-tied intermediaries is also the basis for 
a more focused supervision by FINMA; FINMA has signaled that it will expand its 
supervision of non-tied intermediaries (see message-ISA and article 46 draft-ISA 
concerning FINMA's tasks).
b) Registration
Non-tied insurance intermediaries may carry out their activity only if they are entered 
into a register of non-tied insurance intermediaries that is kept by FINMA 
(articles 41(1) and 42 draft-ISA). The draft-ISA plans to expand the current registration 
requirements by introducing the requirements of (a) seat, domicile or branch in 
Switzerland, (b) good reputation and the guarantee for the fulfillment of obligations 
under the draft-ISA, and (c) registration with an ombudsman's office (article 41(2) 
draft-ISA).
The proposed introduction of a new requirement to have a seat, domicile or branch in 
Switzerland means that foreign non-tied insurance intermediaries without physical 
presence in Switzerland (i.e. acting on a pure cross-border basis) would no longer be 
admissible for registration and thus for carrying out their activity in Switzerland 
(in contrast to foreign "advisers" under the FSA). Only activities outside the territorial 
or substantive scope of the draft-ISA would remain permissible (e.g. see article 2(2)(f) 
draft-ISA concerning the intermediation of certain supplementary insurance products). 
The message-ISA explains that this requirement "appears to be essential for effective 
supervision by FINMA", in particular the enforcement of its supervisory instruments. 
However, FINMA may grant exceptions in justified cases (begründeten Fällen). The 
message-ISA does not specify what such cases may be.
Tied insurance intermediaries are not subject to registration duties. In contrast to today, 
they may no longer register themselves voluntarily, unless they provide evidence of 
desiring to take up an activity abroad and of the foreign law requiring a Swiss register 
entry (article 42(4) draft-ISA).
c) Conflicts of Interest / Organizational Precautions
Insurance intermediaries (tied and non-tied) are obliged to (a) identify potential 



















these from occurring or from disadvantaging the insureds (article 45a(1) draft-ISA). If 
disadvantages for insureds cannot be excluded, this must be disclosed to them before 
concluding an insurance contract (article 45a(2) draft-ISA). The Federal Council is 
authorized to regulate the details. A corresponding obligation exists for insurance 
companies in article 14a draft-ISA. 
d) Basic Training and Further Education
Insurance intermediaries (tied and non-tied) are required to have the skills and 
knowledge necessary for their activities (article 43 draft-ISA). The insurance 
companies and the insurance intermediaries have to define sector-specific minimum 
standards for basic training and further education. Should no appropriate minimum 
standards exist, the Federal Council shall determine these.
e) Ombudsman's Office
Non-tied insurance intermediaries (as well as insurance companies) are required 
to register with an ombudsman's office (article 82c(1) draft-ISA). This aims at providing 
insureds with the possibility of a mediation procedure before an ombudsman for all 
disputes (see message-ISA). The Swiss Federal Department of Finance is responsible 
for recognizing ombudsman's offices; recognition is subject to certain requirements 
being met (article 83 draft-ISA). Insurance companies that have only professional 





















Partial revision of the Insurance Contract Act
Reference: CapLaw-2020-72
On June 19, 2020, the Swiss Parliament approved the partial revision of the Insurance 
Contract Act (ICA). The revised ICA will enter into force on 1 January 2022. The 
following article is intended to provide an overview of some (but not all) of the 
changes (for the revised ICA see https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2020/ 
5661.pdf). References to articles of the ICA are references to the revised law (unless 
otherwise noted).
By Reto M. Jenny
1) Other text forms as an alternative to communication in written form
For various communications under the revised ICA, as an alternative to the simple 
written form (article 12 et seqq. of the Code of Obligations, CO), the proof by text 
shall be possible. In contrast to the simple written form, this does not require a manual 
signature.
2) Right of withdrawal (articles 2a and 2b ICA)
The revised ICA provides for a possibility of the policyholder to withdraw, within 14 days, 
its offer for the conclusion of the insurance contract or the declaration of acceptance 
of the offer. The time limit of 14 days starts running as soon as the policyholder has 
submitted its offer or accepted the contract. The deadline is met where the policyholder 
notifies the insurance company on the last day of the deadline of his/her withdrawal or 
hands over his/her withdrawal declaration to the post office. 
However, the policyholder's right to withdraw does not extend to (key) contract 
modifications; a corresponding suggestion did not find a majority in the parliament. The 
right of withdrawal is excluded in the case of collective personal insurance, provisional 
cover notes and agreements with a term of less than one month. 
The withdrawal has the effect that the offer for the conclusion of a contract or the 
policyholder's declaration of acceptance is ineffective from the beginning. The parties 
must reimburse services already received. In line with the Supreme Court case law in 
connection with the right of withdrawal for door-to-door sales and similar contracts 
(according to the CO), such reimbursement is governed by the provisions regarding 
unjust enrichment. 
3) Rights of termination (articles 3a, 28a, 35a, 35b, 36, and 46b ICA)
The revision also deals with rights of termination, and the amendments include the 
following: The revision amends the policyholder's right of termination where the in-



















amendment concerns the expiration of the termination right after two years (currently 
after one year) since the violation of the information duty (article 3a (2) ICA).
In the event of a significant reduction in risk, the revised ICA foresees a right of the 
policyholder to terminate the contract with a notice period of four weeks or to demand 
a reduction in premium. If the insurance company refuses a premium reduction or if 
the policyholder does not agree to the offered reduction, the policyholder may termi-
nate the contract within four weeks after receipt of the insurer's comments (article 28a 
ICA).
The revised ICA provides for an ordinary right of termination at the end of the third or 
each subsequent year with a period of notice of three months. This provision aims at 
insurance contracts with a duration of more than three years (article 35a (1) ICA). The 
contractual parties are free to stipulate an ordinary termination already before the ex-
piry of the third year, but the notice period shall be identical for both parties (article 35a 
(2) ICA). For life insurance contracts, there is no ordinary right of termination according 
to article 35a ICA, but the policyholder is entitled, regardless of the agreed duration, to 
terminate the life insurance contract after one year (article 89 ICA). In case of a supple-
mentary health insurance to the social health insurance, the ordinary right of termination 
and the right of termination in a loss event (cf. article 42 (1) of the current ICA), shall be 
available to the policyholder only. For a collective daily benefits insurance, both parties 
are entitled to these rights (article 35a (4) ICA).
The revised ICA stipulates also an extraordinary right of termination: As for other long-
term contracts, an insurance contract may be terminated for important reasons (arti-
cle 35b ICA). Any circumstance which makes, according to a good faith standard, the 
continuation of the contract unacceptable to the terminating person constitutes such 
an important reason. The same holds true for an unforeseeable change in the legal 
requirements, which makes the fulfillment of the contract impossible (article 35b (2) 
ICA). In the dispatch of the Federal Council, a change of the practice on the basis of 
FINMA circulars is mentioned as a possible example, while it is, at the same time, re-
ferred to the fact that extraordinary terminations should be, as a matter of principle, 
rather rare. Contractual provisions permitting an insurance company to unilaterally limit 
the duration or extent of, or to annul, periodic obligations as a consequence of illness 
or accident in case of termination after the occurrence of the insured event are null 
and void (article 35c ICA). 
Further, in case of lack of the necessary license, or of its revocation, of the insurance 
company, the policyholder is entitled to terminate the contract at any time (article 36 
ICA). 
Further, the law provides for a termination right of the policyholder in case a so-called 



















occurrence of a multiple insurance at the time of the conclusion of the later contract 
(article 46b (2) ICA). The termination right is limited to four weeks since detection of 
the multiple insurance.
4) Non-disclosure (article 6 (3) ICA)
The revised ICA explicitly stipulates a causality requirement for benefit reductions in 
case of non-disclosure of material facts for the assessment of the peril: If the contract 
is terminated by cancellation in accordance with paragraph 1, the insurer's obligation 
to pay benefits for losses that have already occurred shall lapse insofar as the 
occurrence or extent of such losses has been influenced by the non-disclosure or the 
incorrect notification of a significant risk event (article 6 (3) ICA).
Instead of the requirement of written questions and answers, the revised law stipulates 
that questions and answers can either be in writing or in any other form allowing proof 
by text (e.g. online or by email).
5) Retroactive insurance (article 10 ICA)
Further, the revised law provides that the effects of the insurance contract can be 
referred back to a point in time before its conclusion, provided that an insurable interest 
exists. Such retroactive insurance is void if only the policyholder or the insured knew or 
had to know that an insured event had already occurred (article 10 ICA). In contrast, the 
current law provides, with basically the exception of fire and transport insurance, for the 
nullity of such retroactive insurance, which triggered wide criticism from legal scholars. 
By abolishment of the old provision, the revised law provides more legal certainty, 
in particular for claims-made policies and addresses cases such as the polyarthritis 
case of the Supreme Court (BGE 127 II 21): In that case, an insured concluded a 
supplemental health insurance contract and notified, upon conclusion of the insurance 
contract, her illness. At that moment, she had been pain-free for a prolonged period. 
Shortly after conclusion of the contract, however, the illness broke out again. The 
insurance company denied coverage, and the Supreme Court protected that decision, 
holding that the insured peril has materialized prior to the contract conclusion. 
6) Breach of obligations (article 45 ICA)
The law currently in place has already provided for a requirement of fault: Negative 
consequences of a breach of obligations by the policyholder/beneficiary agreed upon 
by the parties could only be held against the policyholder/beneficiary to the extent that 
such violation was made by fault. According to the current Supreme Court case law, 
however, an insurer could have denied coverage where no causal requirement was 
explicitly agreed upon (i.e., the policy remained silent on that issue) to the extent that the 
law does not otherwise provide for such a causality requirement (as in the case of the 



















the breach of contractual obligations by the policyholder or the insured: To the extent 
that the policyholder proves that the violation had no influence on the occurrence of 
the insured event and on the scope of the benefits owed by the insurance company, an 
agreement burdening the insured with a legal disadvantage in case of non-compliance 
would be invalid (article 45 (2) (b) ICA). 
7) Down payments (article 41a ICA)
The revised ICA contemplates a beneficiary's right to request down payments for the 
amount undisputed by the insurance company once its claim is due.
8) Limitation period (article 46 ICA)
The revised ICA stipulates for a longer limitation period of five years (instead of two 
years), starting to run from the moment in time when the event triggering the insurer's 
indemnification duty occurs. An exception exists for claims arising from the contract of 
collective daily sickness benefit insurance: The limitation period is two years in such 
cases. The revision has not modified the moment in time when the limitation period 
starts running (dies a quo). 
9) Direct right of action for liability insurance (article 60 ICA)
A fundamental change of the revised law includes the direct right of action in the field 
of liability insurance: The damaged third party or his legal successor may directly claim, 
within the scope of any existing insurance cover and subject to the objections and 
defenses which the insurance company can hold against him based upon law or the 
contract, against the insurance company (article 60 (1bis) ICA). Such direct right of 
action is not alien to Swiss law, but has so far been limited to a few instances, e.g. in 
the ambit of the Road Traffic Act.
In the case of compulsory liability insurance, defenses arising from gross negligence or 
willful causation of the insured event, breaches of contractual obligations, non-payment 
of premiums or a contractually agreed upon deductible cannot be held against the 
damaged third parties (article 59 (3) ICA).
Other changes for the liability insurance concern the extension of cover to all employees 
of the insured company for business liability insurance (Betriebshaftpflichtversicherung; 
article 59 (1) ICA) as well as the clarification that recourse claims of third parties are 
covered, too (article 59 (3) ICA).
10) Right of recourse
The new law provides for a right of recourse of the non-life insurer. Prior to the 
Supreme Court decision of the year 2018 (BGE 144 III 209), the insurance company 



















according to contract and could not take recourse against such persons who were 
liable based on law (with no fault; Kausalhaftung). Based on the new law, the insurance 
company will be able to take recourse against all persons liable to pay compensation/
damages, i.e., also against such who face contractual or causal liability. According to 
legal scholars, liability insurers, however, do not have an integral right of recourse, but 
their position is still limited by article 51 (2) CO. 
11) The professional policyholder (article 98 (2) ICA)
The revised ICA introduces the notion of the professional policyholder. With respect 
to them, the prohibition to contractually deviate from certain absolutely mandatory 
provisions (article 97 ICA) or, to the detriment of the policyholder or the insured, from 
other provisions (article 98 ICA) does not exist, i.e., where the contract is concluded with 
a professional policyholder, the parties may derogate from such mandatory provisions 
(cf. article 97 and 98 ICA). The term professional policyholder is defined by law 
(article 98 (2) ICA) and includes, inter alia, companies with a professional risk 
management (article 98 (2) (f) ICA) and companies that exceed two of the following 
three criteria: (i) balance sheet total of CHF 20m; (ii) net revenue of CHF 40m; and (iii) 
equity/net assets of CHF 2m (article 98 (2) (g) ICA).
Reto M. Jenny (reto.jenny@prager-dreifuss.com)
The limited qualified investor fund (L-QIF) – an innovation 
for the Swiss fund and asset management industry 
Reference: CapLaw-2020-73
Swiss funds are frequently not investors' first choice, especially as regards alternative 
investments for professional investors, where time to market is often crucial. High 
time and cost pressure means that even Swiss clients often prefer foreign funds. 
With the L-QIF, Switzerland will have a real alternative designed to strengthen the 
competitiveness of its fund and asset management industry by increasing the number 
of collective investment schemes launched in the country. The way has been paved, 
and it will ultimately be up to the politicians and the Swiss fund and asset management 
industry itself to make good use of the L-QIF. So far, the outlook is promising. 
By Diana Imbach Haumüller
1) Background
a) Competitive disadvantage of Swiss funds
Switzerland is an important location for asset management and the distribution of 



















investment schemes is not strong. Restricted distribution possibilities abroad on the 
one hand, namely due to the lack of recognition of Swiss securities funds under the 
UCITS Directive and the still pending decision on the AIFMD third-country passport, 
and the unfavorable Swiss withholding tax on the other hand, have a negative 
impact on the competitiveness of Swiss funds on an international level. Further, the 
considerable amount of time and expense involved in acquiring the necessary product 
approval results in even Swiss clients giving preference to foreign collective investment 
schemes over Swiss ones. Particularly when it comes to alternative and innovative fund 
products for qualified investors, today's Swiss funds are often not competitive. This is 
an unsatisfactory situation, especially given the ample pool of outstanding expertise 
available within Switzerland's fund and asset management industry. 
Against this background, the Asset Management Association Switzerland (formerly 
the Swiss Funds and Asset Management Association SFAMA) initiated the idea of 
the limited qualified investor fund (L-QIF). The core element of the proposal was to 
provide a flexible collective investment scheme under Swiss law which will not require 
FINMA approval and so can be set up much more quickly and cost-effectively. This 
product, which is to be available only to qualified investors as defined by the Collective 
Investment Schemes Act (CISA), should nevertheless guarantee the customary levels 
of quality and security. To this end, while L-QIFs themselves will not require approval, 
their asset manager or fund management company must be an institution supervised 
by FINMA. Indirect fund supervision such as this takes due account of qualified 
investors' need for client protection, so it is important to point out that L-QIFs will not 
be unregulated as they will have to comply with the rules set out in the CISA.
Other fund locations already have such fund vehicles, a case in point being the 
Luxembourg RAIF (Reserved Alternative Investment Fund), which has already become 
established and is also used by institutional investors in Switzerland.
b) Development of the draft bill
The Federal Council took up the initiative and mandated the Federal Department of 
Finance (FDF) on 5 September 2018 to prepare a corresponding draft. Meanwhile, 
the idea of the L-QIF also found broad support in parliament. A motion to this effect 
by Ruedi Noser, member of the Council of States, was adopted by the Council of 
States on 24 September 2018 and subsequently by the National Council on 13 March 
2019, with overwhelming majorities in both cases. Shortly after this, on 26 June 2019, 
the Federal Council opened the consultation process for an amendment to the CISA 
to create the L-QIF. The consultation draft met with broad approval, leading to the 
adoption of the dispatch on 19 August 2020, albeit with a slight delay due to the 
COVID-19 situation. Currently, it is expected that the Council of States will discuss the 



















If this pace can be kept up, it seems realistic that the first L-QIF can be launched as 
early as 2022.
2) Structure, systematics, and key features
a) Principle
The L-QIF is not a new category of financial instruments but a collective investment 
scheme according to the CISA and thus generally subject to the provisions of the 
CISA. Only for the sake of clarity, this is again stated in Art. 118a para. 2 Draft-CISA 
(D-CISA). Any exceptions to this principle are explicitly stated in the Act itself, either 
in the new, L-QIF-specific title 3a. (Art. 118a et seqq. D-CISA), or in corresponding 
provisions in other articles throughout the Act, such as the provisions on licensing 
(Art. 13 para. 2bis D-CISA) or approval (Art. 15 para. 3 D-CISA).
Art. 118d D-CISA comprises a comprehensive catalog of provisions which are not 
applicable to the L-QIF. This negative catalog contains (under letter a) the investment 
requirements which do not apply to the L-QIF and are replaced by specific provisions 
in the new title 3a as well as (under letter b) articles which do not fit from a conceptual 
point of view. The latter particularly include provisions granting FINMA the power to 
take decisions in individual cases or supervisory powers. One of the most prominent 
articles in this regard is Art. 10 para. 5 CISA, giving FINMA the power to fully or 
partially exempt collective investment schemes from certain provisions of the financial 
market acts, provided that they are exclusively open to qualified investors and that the 
protective purpose of the Act is not impaired. Since the L-QIF is neither approved nor 
authorized by FINMA and is also not supervised, such powers would be useless in the 
case of the L-QIF. Adequate substitutes for these regulations are therefore needed. 
Because the L-QIF is undoubtedly a collective investment scheme under the CISA, 
it must also be treated equally to other Swiss funds from a tax perspective. Like the 
explanatory report before it, the dispatch explicitly states that the tax treatment of the 
L-QIF will not differ from that of other Swiss funds, including single-investor funds. This 
is a clear statement and a key element for the success of the L-QIF in practice.
b) Key features of the L-QIF
The regulation of the L-QIF is based on its legal definition (Art. 118a para. 1 D-CISA), 
which comprises of four core elements with which all L-QIFs must comply:
 1. Collective investment scheme according to the CISA 
 2. Only open to qualified investors (let. a)
 3. Managed according to the specific provisions for L-QIFs (let. b)



















If the fund fails to comply with one or more elements of this legal definition, FINMA 
approval is mandatory (Art. 15 CISA). The following explanations take up the most 
important features of these four core elements of the L-QIF.
3) Collective investment scheme according to the CISA
a) L-QIF: a Swiss fund
This is the first core element, stipulated in the introductory sentence of Art. 118a para. 
1 D-CISA. Consequently, an L-QIF is necessarily a Swiss collective investment scheme 
within the meaning of Art. 7 CISA, i.e. in particular collective investment by the investors, 
third-party management, and the principle of equal treatment of the investors. 
b) Legal form and eligible assets
As a Swiss collective investment scheme, the L-QIF must be structured according to 
one of the legal forms provided for in the CISA. This has been clarified, albeit indirectly, 
by Art. 118c D-CISA, which states that the L-QIF must have either the legal form of a 
contractual investment fund, an investment company with variable capital (SICAV) or 
a limited partnership for collective investment (LP). Contrary to the consultation draft, 
an investment company with fixed capital (SICAF) is not an eligible legal form. In this 
respect, the dispatch points out that the structuring of an L-QIF as a SICAF is no 
longer an option, this being due in part to the recent abolition of bearer shares. It also 
seems appropriate to exclude the SICAF from the group of possible legal forms for the 
L-QIF in view of its very limited practical relevance.
As the aim of the bill is to promote innovation, the investment regulations regarding the 
L-QIF will be liberalized, particularly in view of the limited circle of investors. The law 
thus contains no restrictions regarding possible investments or the distribution of risk, 
making the concept of the L-QIF extremely flexible. However, transparency toward the 
investors is key, and these topics must be disclosed in the fund documents accordingly 
(Art. 118n and Art. 118o D-CISA). This means that "hybrid" L-QIFs investing in a 
combination of different asset classes, such as securities and real estate, are also 
permitted. Besides the better time to market, this flexibility makes the L-QIF extremely 
attractive. 
However, even though the L-QIF is very flexible it should be kept in mind that basic 
principles applicable to all collective investment schemes also apply to L-QIFs. Against 
this background, the draft establishes in Art. 78a D-CISA the general principle 
according to which the fund management company or the SICAV must ensure that 
the liquidity of the collective investment scheme is appropriate to the investments, 
investment policy, risk diversification, group of investors and redemption frequency. 
This principle is not new but will now be explicitly stated in the CISA which is also in 



















As the investment regulations applying to the four fund categories of FINMA-approved 
open-ended collective investment schemes, i.e. securities funds, real estate funds or 
other funds for traditional and alternative investments are not applicable to the L-QIF, it 
is not possible to use the names of those categories for an L-QIF as this could mislead 
investors (Art. 118e para. 3 D-CISA). This means for instance that there will be no 
"real estate fund L-QIF", even if a specific L-QIF would in fact apply the investment 
regulations for FINMA approved real estate funds. Finally, it has to be made transparent 
to investors that an L-QIF is not approved, licensed or supervised by FINMA (Art. 118e 
D-CISA). This is of course a matter of transparency for the investors. 
4) Only open to qualified investors
The second core element according to the legal definition concerns the limited circle 
of investors, with investments in L-QIFs reserved exclusively for qualified investors 
(Art. 118a para. 1 let. a D-CISA). Art. 10 CISA defines which investors are considered 
qualified in this sense. According to Art. 10 para. 3 CISA, all professional clients 
according to the Financial Services Act (FinSA) are considered qualified investors 
according to the CISA. These include both professional clients in the narrower sense 
and institutional clients according to Art. 4 para. 4, and Art. 5 paras 3 and 4 FinSA. 
In addition, according to Art. 10 para. 3ter CISA, private clients within the scope of a 
long-term asset management or investment advisory agreement with a prudentially 
supervised financial intermediary pursuant to Art. 4 para. 3 lets a and c FinSA are 
qualified, unless they have declared that they do not wish to be considered as such. 
It is interesting to note that with regard to the segmentation of insurance companies' 
clients, the draft contains some general adjustments. In particular, with the entry into 
force of the L-QIF regulation, asset management and advisory clients of FINMA-
supervised insurance companies will also be considered as qualified investors 
according to Art. 10 CISA.
The draft does not differentiate between the different categories of qualified investors. 
This is amongst others for the following reasons appropriate: 
– Unlike private investors, professional investors are capable of understanding the in-
vestments and risks of complex financial instruments in detail. Furthermore, lengthy 
negotiations on the detailed design of collective investment schemes for such in-
vestors are often conducted in practice prior to the formal product approval pro-
cess. Once an agreement has been reached on the conditions and the wording of 
the fund documents, investors should be able to invest as quickly as possible. Espe-
cially in the case of more complex funds, however, the corresponding approval pro-
cess can easily take a few more months. If time to market is too long, this is a "deal 




















– In addition, as professional investors are qualified investors according to Art. 10 
CISA, the respective foreign collective investment schemes are not – unlike Swiss 
funds – subject to the approval of FINMA or even any foreign supervisory author-
ity according to Swiss law. With the FinSA and the Financial Institutions Act (FinIA), 
which entered into force on 1 January 2020, this distortion of competition to the 
detriment of Swiss funds has become even more pronounced as the correspond-
ing adjustment in Art. 120 para. 4 CISA limits the obligation of foreign collective in-
vestment schemes to appoint a FINMA-licensed representative and a paying agent 
in Switzerland for "per se" professional investors according to the FinSA. The L-QIF 
will contribute to a level playing field between Swiss and foreign funds.
– Finally, the L-QIF does not create additional risks for qualified investors. Many of 
these investors are investing in foreign funds or structured products that are also 
not FINMA approved and to which no product-specific supervisory rules apply. With 
the "indirect supervision" of the L-QIF a Swiss based, FINMA licensed manager is 
necessarily involved. This also strengthens the protection of these investors.
5) The concept of indirect supervision
a) Principle
The third core element of the L-QIF is its management according to the specific 
regulations for the L-QIF as stipulated in Art. 118g and Art. 118h D-CISA (Art. 118a 
para. 1 let. b D-CISA). In this context, the term "management" is used as a generic term 
for the activities addressed in Art. 118g and 118h D-CISA (operational management, 
administration, asset management, investment decisions) and not only for investment 
decisions. 
The aim of the L-QIF is to eliminate the dual supervision of product and institution. 
However, this is only possible if a financial intermediary approved and supervised 
by FINMA "assumes responsibility" for the collective investment scheme. This is 
often referred to as "indirect supervision" of the L-QIF, as only certain financial 
intermediaries supervised by FINMA can manage them in the sense mentioned above. 
These administrators or managers must comply with all supervisory obligations and 
are supervised by FINMA in this respect, since they are themselves licensees. Such 
supervisory obligations also include compliance with all legal obligations regarding the 
management of collective investment schemes, including L-QIFs. To ensure this, an 
appropriate organization (Art. 9 para. 1 FinIA) is required at all times, among other things. 
As this is a crucial part of the licensing process for financial intermediaries, it is also 
highly relevant in the supervision of a FINMA-licensed financial intermediary managing 
an L-QIF. If there is a severe breach of obligations relating to the management of an 



















Against this background, all L-QIFs must also undergo an audit, conducted by the 
supervisory auditor of the FINMA licensed manager of the L-QIF (Art. 118i CISA). 
The respective regime should essentially correspond to that for approved collective 
investment schemes, but the details will only be provided in the implementing ordinance 
(Art. 118i para.6 D-CISA). 
In the case of collective investment schemes organized under company law, i.e. a SICAV 
or LP, the product and the licensee, i.e. the fund company, are identical. Therefore, 
SICAVs and LPs normally require a license (Art. 13 para. 2 lets b and c CISA), and 
the relevant fund documents must also be approved by FINMA (Art. 15 para. 1 CISA). 
In order to achieve a considerably shorter time to market, both the license and the 
product approval must be waived in the case of corporate legal forms of the L-QIF. 
This is provided for in Arts 13 and 15 D-CISA. Consequently, self-management is not 
permitted for SICAV L-QIFs as such a SICAV is not a FINMA licensed manager. A 
similar concept applies to L-QIFs in the legal form of an LP. 
b) Open-ended L-QIFs
i. Management by a fund management company
Open ended L-QIFs, i.e. contractual investment funds and SICAVs, must be managed 
by a fund management company. For contractual investment funds, this principle is 
stated in Art. 118g para. 1 D-CISA. With regard to SICAVs, this is ensured by requir-
ing that the administration and investment decisions be delegated to one and the same 
fund management company (Art. 118h para. 1 D-CISA). As mentioned above, self-
management is not possible for a SICAV L-QIF.
From a regulatory perspective, the fund management company is formally in charge of 
the L-QIF. It may delegate investment decisions in compliance with the relevant pro-
visions of the FinIA (Art. 14 para. 1 and Art. 35 FinIA) in accordance with Art. 118g 
para. 2 D-CISA. The same also applies to any sub-delegation under Art. 118g para. 3 
D-CISA. These principles apply mutatis mutandis to delegation by the fund manage-
ment company of a SICAV (Art. 118h para. 3 D-CISA).
ii. Delegation
Investment decisions may be delegated to a manager of collective assets in accord-
ance with Art. 2 para. 1 let. c FinIA (Art. 118g para. 2 let. a D-CISA). However, it was 
not the intention to limit the possibility of delegation to managers of collective assets 
only. For the sake of clarification, the dispatch therefore explicitly states that, in accord-
ance with the authorization chain of Art. 6 FinIA, investment decisions may also be del-
egated to institutions that are exempt from the obligation to obtain a license as man-
agers of collective assets due to stricter regulation. Delegation to a bank, a securities 



















insurance undertakings under the Insurance Supervision Act, which are also exempted 
from obtaining a license as managers of collective assets under Art. 9 para. 2 of the Fi-
nancial Institutions Ordinance. For L-QIFs, however, delegation of investment decisions 
to (simple) asset managers pursuant to Art. 17 FinIA is excluded. This also applies to 
any sub-delegation.
The dispatch also emphasizes that an L-QIF can be set up as a single-investor fund, 
and redelegation of the investment decisions to the single investor is possible (Art. 7 
paras 3 and 4 sentence 1), provided that the single investor is subject to prudential 
supervision. However, in contrast to FINMA-approved collective investment schemes, 
no exception to the principle that the single investor must obtain a license is provided 
for which is particularly relevant for pension funds. This stands in contrast to the criti-
cism voiced in the consultation. In practice, for FINMA approved collective investment 
schemes such redelegation is common practice for pension funds, provided that the 
necessary organization is in place and the (cantonal) pension fund supervisory author-
ity agrees. The dispatch justifies the more restrictive position on L-QIFs by stating that 
such redelegation would contradict the principle that investment decisions for L-QIFs 
must be delegated to an institution supervised by FINMA. This reasoning is not en-
tirely conclusive, since the management of an open-ended L-QIF, including investment 
decisions, must in any case be transferred to a fund management company as a first 
step. In the event of redelegation, the fund management company is obliged to super-
vise the delegate appropriately. The same applies, to so-called multi-investor funds, in 
which typically an investor from the group of companies makes the investment deci-
sions.
The delegation of investment decisions by the fund management company to a for-
eign manager of collective assets is also permitted under certain circumstances 
(Art. 118g para. 2 let. b. D-CISA). This is possible if the foreign manager of collective 
assets is adequately regulated and supervised in its country of domicile (cipher. 1) 
and if there is an agreement between FINMA and the competent foreign supervisory 
authority on cooperation and the exchange of information, where such an agreement is 
required by foreign law (cipher. 2).
c) Closed-ended L-QIFs
In the case of an L-QIF in the legal form of an LP, Art. 118h para. 2 D-CISA stipulates 
that management must be delegated to an asset manager of collective assets licensed 
and supervised by FINMA. Based on the authorization chain in Art. 6 FinIA, delega-
tion to a more strictly regulated financial intermediary is also possible. Regarding the 
sub-delegation it can be referred to what has been outlined under section b) above. 
After all, the management of the LP does not have to be delegated under para. 4 if the 



















During the consultation process, a similar regulation to the SICAV was proposed for 
the LP, according to which the management of an L-QIF in the legal form of an LP 
should have been delegated to a fund management company. However, it was pointed 
out that this provision does not make sense for an LP. In contrast to open-ended col-
lective investment schemes, the management or administration in the case of a LP is 
limited to a minimum. The focus is primarily on keeping the fund accounts and certain 
administrative activities such as tax settlements. As closed-ended collective investment 
schemes generally do not issue or redeem units during their term, hardly any decisions 
are necessary, and the setting of issue and redemption prices or income distributions 
is not relevant. Consequently, the activities for which a fund management company is 
particularly qualified are hardly in demand with regard to the management of an LP. 
The revised version of Art. 118h D-CISA is therefore to be welcomed.
6) No approval, license or supervision
a) No approval or authorization of L-QIFs
The fourth and final core element of the L-QIF is the waiver of product approval or au-
thorization on the part of the fund company. According to Art. 118a let. c D-CISA, an 
L-QIF needs neither approval nor authorization. Consequently, Art. 15 para. 3 D-CISA 
provides for an exemption from the obligation to obtain approval of the fund docu-
ments of the L-QIF and any amendments thereto. The same applies to the author-
ization requirement for the SICAV and the LP, in respect of which Art. 13 para. 2bis 
D-CISA now provides for an exception for L-QIFs.
In order to ensure a similar level of transparency for L-QIFs, Art. 118f D-CISA requires 
the institution entrusted with the management of the L-QIF to notify the FDF of the 
assumption or abandonment of the management of an L-QIF. The FDF will maintain 
a publicly accessible directory of all L-QIFs and the institutions responsible for their 
management.
b) Change of status
It is also possible for a collective investment scheme designed as an L-QIF to obtain 
FINMA approval at a later date (opting-up). This seems to be in fact an interesting op-
tion in cases where qualified investors would like to invest and set up a fund quickly 
but are considering opening the fund for other investors at a later stage. With the 
L-QIF the fund could be launched relatively quickly. Once the fund is up and running, 
and has achieved a certain track record, the approval process would be potentially 
swifter, as many questions in the course of the approval process could be answered 
with practical experience. As the initial investors are already invested in the fund, 
there is also no time pressure regarding the approval process. However, in order to 



















collective investment schemes according to CISA, including the more restrictive invest-
ment regulations. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that a collective investment scheme that al-
ready has a FINMA license or approval may wish to become an L-QIF (opting-down). 
Art. 118b D-CISA provides for this possibility. In addition to compliance with the regu-
lations concerning the limited circle of investors (Art. 118a para. 1 let. a D-CISA) and 
the specific administrative provisions for the L-QIF (Art. 118a para. 1 let. B D-CISA), 
the return of the FINMA approval or license is only permissible if it is ensured that the 
interests of existing investors are safeguarded. Further details on the question can be 
expected from the Federal Council on the basis of its power to issue ordinances in Art. 
118b para. 2 D-CISA.
7) Conclusion
The L-QIF project gained momentum very quickly by Swiss standards and is an out-
standing example of measured and purposeful deregulation. The concrete configura-
tion of the draft law is well balanced, even if there is still some room for improvement 
here and there from the perspective of the financial industry, for example with regard 
to redelegation by single-investor funds. The draft will enable the Swiss fund and asset 
management industry to offer its clients increasingly competitive Swiss fund products. 
This will hopefully also have an impact on the range of innovative fund solutions on of-
fer, e.g. in the areas of sustainability and fintech. This would also be an opportunity for 
the Swiss financial sector to position itself as a pioneer. 
The flexible and liberal design of the L-QIF does indeed hold great potential in prac-
tice. However, it is also clear that the L-QIF will remain a collective investment scheme 
under the CISA. On the one hand, this fact sets certain limits to the flexibility of the de-
sign. On the other, it also offers advantages, especially with regard to tax treatment. 
Finally, while its potential should not be overestimated, especially because of the lim-
ited possibilities for its use at international level and the unfavorable Swiss withholding 
tax, the L-QIF offers a great opportunity for the Swiss fund and asset management in-
dustry, and in particular for professional investors in Switzerland. 
*****
The content of this article is the personal opinion of the author. This opinion is not 
necessarily identical to the position of the Asset Management Association Switzerland.



















EU Capital Markets Recovery Package: Meeting the 
Economic Challenges of the "COVID-19 pandemic"?
Reference: CapLaw-2020-74
As part of its overall strategy to repair the immediate economic damage triggered by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the EU is about to adopt a "Capital Markets Recovery Package". 
The aim of the reform is to implement targeted amendments to existing EU capital 
market rules in order to promote market-based finance as one of the core pillars of the 
EU's coronavirus recovery strategy. This article sheds light on the key elements of the 
proposed reforms and assesses whether these regulatory adjustments may also help 
to finally advance the highly ambitious EU Capital Markets Union project.
By Franca Contratto
1) Background and Overview
In the wake of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic the European Union is facing 
a drastic decline in economic growth. While major member states, such as Spain, the 
United Kingdom, Italy and France are among the worst affected economies (estimated 
declines in GDP vary between 9.4% and 12.4%), the EU's cumulated economic 
performance is expected to shrink by 7.4% in 2020.
The EU has developed a broad strategy to mitigate the negative economic impact of 
the coronavirus pandemic. It comprises, among others, a EUR 1.8 trillion "Stimulus 
Package", a "Banking Package" which intends to facilitate bank lending to households 
and businesses as well as a "Capital Markets Recovery Package". While earlier efforts 
to create a pan-European Capital Markets Union (CMU) have so far borne little fruit, 
European policymakers now seem united in their conviction that well-integrated, deep 
capital markets will have a key role to play in financing the post-pandemic recovery. 
Whereas public companies across the EU anxiously seek to be recapitalized, thousands 
of small and medium-sized enterprises require bank loans at an unprecedented level.
Against this background, the Commission has proposed targeted amendments to the 
Prospectus Regulation (EU-Regulation No. 2017/1129, PR), the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (EU-Directive No. 2014/65/EU, MiFID II), the Securitization 
Regulation (EU-Regulation No. 2017/2402, SR) and the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (EU-Regulation No. 575/2013, CRR). The goal of the reform is threefold: 
The Recovery Package seeks to (1) facilitate investments in the real economy, (2) allow 
for a rapid re-capitalization of public companies listed in the EU, and (3) to enhance 
banks' lending capacity, primarily to ensure funding for small and midcap enterprises. 
In their entirety, these erratic pieces of a "regulatory jigsaw" seek to ensure that the 
EU will meet the extremely pressing challenge to secure funding for the post-crisis 



















2) Contents of the "Capital Markets Recovery Package"
a) Introduction of a new short-form "EU Recovery Prospectus"
One of the key goals of the Commissions' recovery package is to facilitate a rapid 
and easy re-capitalization for European issuers who have been heavily affected by 
the economic shock of the COVID-19 crisis. The Commission therefore proposes to 
introduce a new "EU Recovery Prospectus" which shall help issuers to reduce their 
debt-to-equity ratios by means of a simplified and cost-effective procedure. In the 
words of the Commission, the new disclosure instrument shall be "easy to produce for 
companies, easy to read for investors, and easy to scrutinize for national competent 
authorities". To meet these goals, the "EU Recovery Prospectus" will be a stand-alone 
document limited to 30 pages which focuses on essential investor information, such 
as, e.g. risk factors. An amendment to the Transparency Directive (EU-Directive No. 
2013/50, TD) proposed by the European Council would further allow member states 
to postpone the introduction of the new European Single Electronic reporting Format 
(ESEF) for issuers' financial reports by one year.
However, according to the intentions of the EU Commission and the European Council, 
the EU Recovery Prospectus should have a strictly limited scope: It will only be available 
for well-seasoned issuers that have been listed for no less than 18 months and who 
seek to increase equity by issuing shares. The European Council has further highlighted 
the importance of restricting the simplified procedure to economically "meaningful 
capital increases"; it therefore proposes to limit the EU Recovery Prospectus to offers 
which are equivalent to no more than 90% of the outstanding capital thereby avoiding 
highly dilutive issuances. The simplified disclosure regime is meant to be temporary 
and designed to expire 18 months after the date of application of the Regulation.
In turns, the EU passport mechanism will fully apply to the EU Recovery Prospectus so 
as to encourage investments from all over Europe and thereby contributing to an even 
stronger, pan-European integration of national capital markets.
b) Light-touch Adjustments to the MiFID II-Regime
The Commission has further proposed a series of targeted amendments to EU-
Directive No. 2014/65/EU (MiFID II). The key proposals can be characterized as 
follows:
– Phasing-out of paper-based disclosure: Currently, the default method for disclo-
sure and client-related communications as provided for under MiFID II investor pro-
tection standards is paper based. To alleviate the regulatory burden on securities 
firms the Commission proposes to phase out paper-based communication, unless 



















– Exemptions to product governance for non-complex investments: Finan-
cial services relating to non-complex ("plain vanilla") bonds shall be exempted 
from product governance-related requirements as provided for in Article 24(2) 
MiFID II. The exemption applies no matter whether vanilla bonds are sold only to 
professional investors or also distributed to retail clients. 
– Alleviations on reporting duties: The Commission proposes to eliminate or re-
duce certain reporting duties in order to ensure that market participants remain ef-
ficient and competitive despite the challenging environment of the economic down-
turn caused by the pandemic. The proposed alleviations include a suspension of 
best execution reports to be published by trading venues and systematic internaliz-
ers as provided for in Article 27(3) MiFID II ("RTS 27") until 2022.
– Changes to derivatives rules regarding commodity underlyings: Risk reducing 
transactions in energy derivatives (oil, coal, natural gas and power) may play a key 
role to shield the real economy from high volatilities in energy prices due to the cor-
onavirus crisis. To allow effective use of risk reducing transactions the Commission 
proposes changes to the position limit regime and targeted hedging exemptions. 
Overall, the Commission has proved to be rather wise not to trade away established 
investor protection measures provided for in the MiFID II-framework. Political support 
from the European Council and the European Parliament will only be guaranteed if the 
proposed alleviations of the regulatory scheme do not considerably weaken protection 
for lesser-experienced investors and retail clients. 
c) Enlarged Scope of the Simplified Securitization  
Framework ("STS"-Regime)
Another component of the planned EU capital markets recovery package targets 
the EU Simple Transparent Securitization Regime (EU-Regulation No. 2017/2402). 
Adopted with the goal to simplify and standardize the rules applicable to securitizations, 
the so-called "STS-Regime" has only just come into force on 1 January 2019. While 
much effort had been put into drafting a well-balanced set of market-friendly rules, 
recent figures speak a disappointingly clear language: As shown in a recent report 
of the European Financial Markets Association securitization volumes have seen a 
steady and sharp decline from a market high of EUR 182.5bn in 2018 to as low as 
EUR 28.7bn in mid-2020 (cf. AFME press release, European capital markets 
performance in 2020, 28 October 2020). Up until now the STS-Regime has apparently 
not proven the success hoped for.
Nonetheless, the European Commissions is convinced that securitizations will play 
a key role to increase banks' lending capacities and thereby safeguard funding for 



















drafted significant amendments to the STS-Regime in order to incentivize the use of 
securitization as an effective tool to move risk off banks' balance sheets. The proposed 
changes to Regulation No. 2017/2402 can be summarized as follows:
– Extension of the STS-Regime to on-balance sheet synthetic securitizations: 
Provided that certain criteria are met, banks using on-balance sheet synthetic se-
curitizations should in the future profit from the STS-Regime. In contrast to true-
sale securitizations where assets (e.g. mortgages, bank loans etc.) are sold to a 
Securitization Special Purpose Entity (SSPE) and transformed into tradeable securi-
ties, banks originating on-balance sheet synthetic securitization continue to own the 
underlying exposures. However, so-called arbitrage synthetic securitizations, which 
fueled the outbreak of the 2007/08 financial crisis, will not qualify to profit from the 
simplified STS-Regime.
– Removal of regulatory obstacles to allow for the securitization of non-per-
forming exposures (NPEs): As a result to the economic downturn caused by the 
COVID-19 crisis, the volumes of non-performing bank loans are expected to grow 
considerably. The current STS-framework adopted by Regulation No. 2017/2024 
was not designed to allow for NPE securitizations. The reform therefore seeks to 
remove specific regulatory obstacles so as to allow banks to offload non-performing 
exposures in an effective and transparent way.
To avoid greater risks for investors or for financial stability and to maintain the credibility 
of the securitization market, high prudential standards will have to be observed: Whereas 
Regulation No. 2017/2024 already provides for extensive disclosure requirements and 
for a prohibition to sell securitized instruments to retail investors, targeted amendments 
of the Capital Requirements Regulation No. 575/2013 will introduce specific capital 
requirements for synthetic excess spreads (SES). Supervisory authorities may 
impose comprehensive and severe sanctions in case of wrongdoing by any party 
involved in the securitization process. Originators who fail to comply with the relevant 
provisions of the STS regime risk a considerable monetary sanction (minimum of 
EUR 5 Mio./maximum 10% of the annual turnover); they may also be banned 
temporarily from issuing STS-securities and their products will be removed from the 
website listing STS-investments. Member states are free to introduce criminal charges. 
3) Conclusion & Outlook
For decades, European economies have been predominantly bank-based. Despite 
ongoing efforts to establish a strong, fully-integrated European Capital Markets Union, 
statistics for 2019 confirm the persistent weakness of EU capital markets by showing 
that as little as 12% of European companies' funding was raised on capital markets 

































release, Capital markets union needs bolder action to tackle remaining obstacles, 
12 October 2019).
However dramatic the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic may be, there is 
a glimmer of hope that the crisis will also bring something good: The current policy 
proposals give reason to believe that the coronavirus crisis can act as a wake-up call 
to finally abandon the dangerously one-sided dependence on bank-based finance in 
Europe. Provided that EU policymakers take fast forward steps to readjust the current 
regulatory framework EU capital markets may deploy a considerable growth potential 
in the shadow of the crisis and thereby contribute to the creation of a more robust and 
resilient post-pandemic European economy.
 Franca Contratto (franca.contratto@unilu.ch)
Onex Sell-Down of SIG Shares
Reference: CapLaw-2020-75
On 1 December 2020 SIG Combibloc announced that Onex Corporation and its 
affiliates have sold their remaining stake of 32 million shares in SIG representing 
approx. 10.1% of SIG's share capital. Following the settlement of the transaction, Onex 
will cease to be a shareholder of SIG.
LafargeHolcim Issuance of EUR 850 Million  
Sustainability-Linked Notes
Reference: CapLaw-2020-76
Holcim Finance (Luxembourg) S.A. successfully completed the issuance of 
EUR 850,000,000 0.500 per cent. Sustainability-Linked Notes due 2031. The Notes 
are guaranteed by LafargeHolcim Ltd, the holding company of the LafargeHolcim 
group. The Notes are the first sustainability-linked notes in the building materials 
industry aligned to the Sustainability-Linked Bond Principles 2020 published by the 
International Capital Markets Association, with investors entitled to a higher coupon 



























On 16 November 2020 Valora Holding AG successfully completed the private 
placement of 400,000 newly registered shares sourced from existing authorized capital 
and 40,000 treasury shares by way of an accelerated bookbuilding. Credit Suisse and 
UBS acted as Joint Bookrunners.
UBS Issuance of EUR 1.5 Billion Notes
Reference: CapLaw-2020-78
On 5 November 2020, UBS Group AG successfully completed its issuance of 
EUR 1.5 billion in aggregate principal amount of Fixed Rate/Fixed Rate Callable 
Senior Notes due November 2028 under its Senior Debt Programme. The Notes are 
bail-inable (TLAC) bonds that are eligible to count towards UBS's Swiss gone concern 
requirement.
Credit Suisse Group Issuer Substitution under  
Bail-In Bonds
Reference: CapLaw-2020-79
Credit Suisse Group AG was successfully substituted for Credit Suisse Group Funding 
(Guernsey) Limited as issuer under seven different series of outstanding bail-in bonds 
issued by Credit Suisse Group Funding (Guernsey) Limited and with an aggregate 
principal amount of approximately USD 10.4 billion. In connection with this issuer 
substitution, all rights and obligations of Credit Suisse Group Funding (Guernsey) 
Limited under the notes, as well as under the related internal loan agreements pursuant 
to which the net proceeds received from the issuance of the Notes were onlent to 
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